another economist supports direct transfers to the poor

Chennai: A system of conditional direct cash transfers to the poor is the “first best option” to address poverty in India, and would also lead to a “more efficient and rational pricing policy,” economist Arvind Subramanian said here on Saturday.

Attributing India’s “abysmal” record in poverty eradication programmes to “minimal state capacity,” Dr. Subramanian said the country’s well-placed equity concerns could be addressed better by direct cash transfer schemes, as they would “attain the [equity] objectives by minimising the demands made on state capacity.” Citing examples from Mexico and Brazil, he suggested linking cash transfer schemes to conditions such as children going to school, or receiving basic immunisation shots. A start could be made by introducing “experimental projects” in some States.

read the news report in the hindu. my earlier posts advocating a dole [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7].

food security causes stagnation

punjab is the lone exception among food surplus states: all the others, like uttar pradesh, bihar, west bengal, haryana, andhra pradesh etc., have higher undernourishment rates than kerala. and the article i'd referred to in this post points out:

What then explains the high levels of child malnutrition in India? Answers lie in looking beyond income levels, economic expansion, conventional poverty, and food availability.

so, why discuss issues like food availability etc., again? because any discussion on undernourishment among children is inevitably guided, by the brahminized left, towards a debate on hunger (which is okay) and then towards food security (things start becoming unstoppably hazier, at this point) and then onto a discussion on the pds, minimum support prices, subsidies, evil neoliberal policies, globalization and so on. so, i wanted to re-emphasize the irrelevance of the issue of food availability in any discussion on undernourishment among children. food availability, i repeat, is irrelevant to undernourishment. at least, not directly relevant.

so, it doesn't matter whether you have an efficient pds (as in kerala) or a barely patronized pds (as in punjab) : it isn't directly relevant to the issue, in my view. in other words, what governments do to increase food production and availability (which is what food security is about) might have nothing to do with how undernourished the children in a state, or the country, are.

but central government policy on food security affects the people of different states in different ways. kerala produces half as much rice as it did in 1961, because most of its farmers, steadily over the years, are actually leaving agriculture instead of trying to increase production. and in the states which have increased production, by two-three times etc., over the last fifty years, a majority of the farmers are still stuck in agriculture.

in kerala, the children are better fed because people have grown more aware, while in the food surplus states, the farmers have been producing more to consume less and remain ignorant.

food security causes stagnation.

do you really need a 'progressive' goverment to ensure less undernourishment?

anoop saha, in response to my last post says:

Of course, Kerala is not an ideal. But the only explanation of low malnutrition in Kerala compared to AP and WB is that the poorest classes (who are most vulnerable to malnutrition) had a far larger stake in the power here than the other states. (italics mine).

please read the rest of his response too here. and let me add that i agree with most of what he has to say on the communists' social base in kerala.

the poorest classes (who are most vulnerable to malnutrition) had a far larger stake in the power here than the other states.

is that the reason why punjab too has a lower proportion of undernourished children? only 27%, less than even the proportion of undernourished children in kerala! do the dalits and other lower castes in punjab (anoop would prefer to call them poorest classes, i guess) have a large stake in power in punjab just as they do in kerala? dalits constitute nearly 30% of the population in punjab- a large presence. does that translate into a large stake in power? and have the governments in punjab been as progressive as the left front governments in kerala?

no, i don't think so.

more food equals more undernourishment

andhra pradesh grows more than 11 million tonnes of rice every year, kerala grows around 0.6-0.8 million tonnes a year- which state has a higher proportion of undernourished children?

andhra pradesh.

which state is food secure?

andhra pradesh, again. the state grows around 5 million more tonnes of rice than it needs while kerala's yearly output satisfies around one-fifth of its needs.

so much for food security.

kerala's governments, especially the left front led coalitions, have long focussed on redistributive justice- is that a reason why there is less undernourishment among children in kerala? then west bengal, where the communists have had an unhindered control of reins, should have a better record, yes?

no. undernourishment among children, between 0-2 years, is 43.5% in west bengal, much worse than in kerala (28.8). and worse than even in andhra pradesh (36.5).

and to think that west bengal is more food secure than andhra pradesh as it produces more rice. so, what's undernourishment all about? and why should any state aim for food security?

the niti and nyaya of undernourishment

in my previous post, i'd talked about prof. amartya sen's lecture in the indian parliament. 'Much of his lecture was devoted to probing the idea of social justice and drawing a distinction between 'niti' and 'nyaya'' according to the news report. undernourishment in india, according to this slightly old, but definitely enlightening article in the hindu, draws its sustenance from exactly that inherited code of niti and nyaya, from ancient laws which decide the place of each man and woman in our society:

What then explains the high levels of child malnutrition in India? Answers lie in looking beyond income levels, economic expansion, conventional poverty, and food availability. The first clue is found in the proportion of low birthweight babies. Estimates for India reveal that 20 to 30 per cent of babies weigh less than 2,500 grams at birth. This suggests the onset of malnutrition in the womb itself and reflects an inter-generational transfer of malnutrition from the mother to the child. Adversely affecting the birth of well-nourished babies is also the poor health and nutritional status of women. According to NFHS-3, close to one-third of Indian women suffer from Chronic Energy Deficiency and have a Body Mass Index (BMI) of less than 18.5 kg/m2. (italics mine).

the article goes on to list other causes, all of which stem from gender and social inequalities. it isn't just economics, stupid.

it is mostly sociology and politics. or caste and politics. now, wasn't sen aware that our politicians, most of our media, academia and the indignant classes (especially the brahminized left variety) would draw only lessons in economics from his lecture? does sen himself perceive undernourishment as merely an economic problem?

nobel deception

Nobel laureate Amartya Sen on Monday criticised the political class of the country for quietly accepting consistent deprivations such as the “appalling levels” of under-nourishment among children, comprehensive absence of opportunity for basic schooling and continuing lack of entitlement to medical attention.

from the hindu, yesterday (italics mine). and the building in the picture is an anganwadi in my neighbourhood. yes, the shack.

you provide free or subsidized basic schooling through schools and teachers, and free or subsidized medical attention through clinics, doctors and nurses etc- how does one deal with appalling levels of under-nourishment among children? through anganwadis and pds and other clever efforts to ensure food security (and limit incomes in the countryside)?

when prof. sen refers to schooling, medical attention and undernourishment in the same sentence, is he referring to similar problems?

driving ms.roy

the andhra pradesh government has issued 138 government orders until now to make the employment guarantee act, which guarantees 100 days of work to every rural household, work better. a commenter on a telugu channel asks: how many times was the constitution amended?

one report says only 4 lakh people have been provided some work until now. of the 88 lakh applicants who'd been issued job cards in the state. less than 5% performance is okay with p.sainath. i guess it's okay with praful bidwai, who wrote in journals published across the globe and spoke in conferences held in as disparate international venues as the gulf and japan before the act was brought in, too. curiously, he seems to have lost interest in the subject now. like so many others engaged in shouldering the brahminical burden of educating the dumb lower castes about their rights (why not just educate them by making the schools work is a dumber question).

well, 5% seems to be the universal, but unwritten, performance norm expected of most of the 1000 odd schemes in operation right now (yes, there are a 1000 odd schemes according to dr. jayaprakash narayan of lok satta and i'm not sure the number includes schemes fathered exclusively by state governments). including the pds. and silence, or the occasional outburst in defense of failing schemes, also seems to be the universal performance norm expected of radical proponents of all such schemes...after the bills have been passed.

[thanks apurva, hope you're reading this, for leading me to the title].

ravi and ravi

Naval Bhave
------------

The name of this scoundrel is Ravi.
As soon as the day breaks on him to wake
He creates an illusion.
On a span of hand as small and short as the palm
He means to settle all the beings, all of them as if on a platter.
Awaking them all from their slumber.

In his view, there are only two classes-
The haves, the have-nots.

All my properties are only my two bags.
Even then he won't let off, keep quiet
Until he mixes
Divides them, among all.

Dragging them, mixing, admixing
He fixes each one’s shares and parts
Giving mine too as a part.

I couldn't understand so far
Whether we should call him the Naxalite or the Sarvodite.
Maybe both, maybe they are the same
Though not called by the name, the very same.

from kritya. a poem by ismail, translated by dr.v.kondal rao.

as man, river
------------
i know him
----------

life-drawing

lifeless state*

i know him as a life, a current

call him mattem ravi kumar**

call him manjeera


in the city among students in thousands

in warangal among peasants coolies in lakhs

in the jungle, plains for long

he flowed as the spirit of battle


poetry prose

the homeopathy of sweetened pills

the surgical intervention of guerilla strategy

whatever he wrote

it became thesis anti-thesis

as debated by a democrat


in the south telangana plains

where the river flows

in leaf-green attire

he dreamt of taking part in the drill


in the dandakaranya nallamala

to the leaf-green jungle

to the leaf-less jungle

that rivers flow and run dry

but do not die he taught


what's changed even now

our walking running river

might be the stream of our tears

or as another ancient poet said

tomorrow the roar that shall strike your heart dumb

it's become that immortal river.

a poem by varavara rao from here. i tried the translation, taking some liberties (especially with the last two lines).

update: since last night, i realized the translated poem needs some punctuation (the poet didn't use any). and also that these two references needed to be clarified-

* state: as in nation-state, and not as in a state in a federation.
** mattem or mattam ravi kumar: read more about him here and strangely, here.

enjoy india

quoting from an article on sudha bharadwaj in the telegraph:

She sat through all her examinations with an easy nonchalance, topping in each of them. Her five years at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, were a repetition of the story. A piping first class resting in her pocket, the world was at her feet, more so since, by virtue of the place of her birth, she was the possessor of an American passport.

She could have gone away to the US, earned academic plaudits and plenty of money in a university position. She could have joined a transnational corporation as some sort of a technical apparat. She could have become a management guru in India itself, or travelled high along the totem pole of the Indian administrative service. She did none of these. Once she reached the age of 18, she walked to the US embassy in New Delhi, disowned her American nationality, and returned her passport. Sudha then slipped away into the wilderness of the Chhattisgarh forests.

you didn't top in any of your exams, didn't sit through, with easy nonchalance, five years at iit, wherever. therefore, you couldn't have gone to the u.s., and earned 'plaudits and plenty of money', or joined some transnational corporation as 'some sort of a technical apparat' or become 'a management guru in india (shiver) itself, or travelled high 'along the totem pole of the indian administrative service'.

india must be very easy for you, chhattisgarhis. and the rest of you, indians. especially since you sacrificed nothing to enjoy all this wilderness.

asses in ananthapur

Two asses, maybe a combine.
One standing this side, another that side
As if in a trance.

Agreeing
"Who knows which way wisdom would dawn",
They decide to man both the sides, North and the South
One at one end, another at another.

Suddenly, the one manning the South bursts out into a neigh
Coming back to its original position
Running for some time round and round around.
The second one would neither move nor ask
As to what happened for the other one to so happen
Knowing full well that wisdom would only dawn
From this but not from that end.

a poem by ismail, the anubhuti poet, that i found at kritya (translated from telugu by dr.v.kondal rao). anubhuti poetry, ismail says elswhere, is the point where experience and feeling meet.

who pays for your food security?

murli deora says the country's oil companies will lose rs.2,25,000 crores in revenues if they continue to sell petrol & diesel at last week's prices. hence the hike. to save the oil companies. but there is a lot of merit in the argument of the left: the government doesn't need to raise the prices, it just needs to reduce the duties and taxes. one might think that the government and the left have different objectives: the government wishes to save the oil companies while the left is concerned about the consumer. one's wrong.

both of them wish to save those who work in the oil companies and those who buy their products: the brahminized classes. in real terms, neither is exploited because losses do not mean layoffs for the first category of the brahminized classes and higher costs do not mean lower subsidies for the consuming category. a majority of the motorized vehicle owners in the country work in the organized sector or are self-employed professionals or are businessmen selling goods and services to the other two classes of people or are those fortunate farmers whose efficiency is rewarded by the government through, for instance, loans and loan waivers. all those classes have the freedom to raise the prices of the goods and services they produce and sell: so, they can take the extra cost. so, who actually pays for their oil security? those who do not have the freedom to raise the prices of goods and services they sell, but still have to pay extra for the goods and services sold by the first classes of people (the brahminized classes). who pays for your oil security? the same folks who pay for your food security. like maize farmers, for instance.

the world's open only for iitians etc

the united states has diverted around 30 million tonnes of its maize/corn production this year to ethanol production. that's around 5% of the world maize output, and a much larger percentage of the tradeable maize surpluses in the world. the world needs those 30 million tonnes to feed millions of non-americans and also americans (each of whom would be paying $47 extra because of the increase in corn prices): who'll step in and produce and supply those 30 million tonnes?

indian farmers can fill a significant portion of that shortfall in the short term of 1-2 years and, perhaps, more than half of the gap in 4-5 years. but the indian government won't allow them to do it.

if prices go up, the government imposes a ban on exports thereby controlling the maize farmer's returns. this is what happened in april this year.

if the domestic market expands because of the entry of new, large users, the government threatens controls on sale of maize to these new users. this happened, again, in april this year. and again, the maize farmer paid the price for your food security.

who's the maize farmer?

you should recognize him from this recent post. maize is mostly grown in the arid, rainfed regions of india. which means large parts of central and peninsular india: the regions with the most inter-state and intra-state migrations. yes, places like mahbubnagar (check this page). though maize is the third most widely grown cereal in the country, it doesn't rate the same attention from the government as wheat and rice. the fci is not so interested in procuring the grain or storing it for distribution via the pds. less than 20% of maize farmers have access to regular irrigation- no state government is overly concerned about improving that situation. but the indian state does expect a heavy price from the mostly lower caste maize farmer for being a citizen of this country.

it expects him to pay a price that it has never asked any graduate from the iits or iims or the innumerable less well-known engineering and medical colleges and universities in the country to pay: to sell his labour and his future at a certain price and place, to certain parties. no questions asked.

i don't really know how to end this post: the ironies are too overwhelmingly large and i don't think they need to be pointed out again.

a soul mate

some interesting remarks made by commenter ghulam mohammed here:

The whole community that formed about 30 percent in British India, were divided in three antagonist groups, by Nehru and Indira, both Brahmins. In sixty years of Indian independence, Muslims have been so devilishly persecuted for the alleged sin of partition, that they had no confidence left to challenge the false propaganda of the power grabbers. In United India, one can see that Muslim population percentage with a democratic constitution, would have been ruling the whole subcontinent. I can go on and on, listing the sins of Brahmins and Brahminical conspiracies. The trouble with Sudie is that he cannot see his back. There is no smoke without the fire. If Brahmins are clearly pointed out as the culprits in the plight of the Muslims, one can see how all Brahminical political groups — Congress, BJP, Communists — all led by Brahmins are blatantly perpertrating crimes against Muslims and still hide behind the pious garb of secularism. A day will come, when the 3% Brahmins will not be able to concoct and flaunt the 85% Hindus as majorities.
[...]

If 3% Brahmins can conjure up a majority of 85 percent “Hindus” — by projecting 15% Muslims in Independent India, as the other, the ‘other’ who have supposedly divided ‘Mother India’, then no one should rule out the possibility of a 30% Muslim population of Indian sub-continent, after 60 years of freedom from British colonial rule, could have been overtly or covertly registered its overwhelming presence in Indian (sub-continental) politics and would have been virtually ruling India, just like the present 3% Brahmins, by cleverly organising through propaganda, a 85% Hindu majority and ruling the roost.

Thanks to Mandal, that unity of 85% is now fast disintegrating and all sorts of permutations and combinations are in play. Muslims are in serious disarray, but be rest assured that there is constant churning in their midst to regain their due. The mere mention of that possibility has ignited our friend. That is expected. He had never encountered an Indian Muslim speaking in these terms. It is the monumental scale of demonisation of Muslims, in India and abroad, that the virtues of a peaceful, humane and progressive Islam are not being given any thought to.
[...]

First I will start, with Congress. Pandit Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Lal Bahadur Shastri, PV Narasimha Rao, are all Brahmins. ManMohan Singh is a powerless appointee — the real power lies with Sonia Gandhi, a Super Brahmin, a white from a European country. If Congress had any place for non-Brahmins, we would have seen Sardar Patel at the one end, and Sharad Pawar at the other end of its 60 year history to have become Prime Minister, even from among the Congress members. The top place and total power is reserved only for a Brahmin. Only a Brahmin is eligible.

BJP: All RSS stalwarts, from Hedgewar, Golwalkar to the present Vajpayee and a whole list of leaders are all Brahmins. Advani had been given tough time, just because he is not a Brahmin. There is many a slip between the cup and the lips and we have to see if Advani can ever become PM.

CPM: Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu, Buddhadeb, Prakash Karat are all Brahmins; so is the all the front ranking Communist party.

no one's going to light any candles for dead gujjars

certainly not at india gate. nor will anyone from jnu ever hold any marches for them- they'd have been celebrated if they were vietnamese or bolivians, not gujjars. not people stupid enough to believe in election promises, as a pundit remarked on television.

the brahminized classes use different scales for measuring these kind of problems. one poor brahmin among thirty would always rate more media attention and angst and breastbeating than 27 poor gujjars among 30. isn't are brahmins the dalits of today the most widely circulated article ever among indian netizens? i never expect much from the indian media, but the fact that such a pathetic piece of shuddhest cow shit was actually published by a news portal never ceases to amaze me.

let's try to get a grasp of the scale of the problem: there are more gujjars in the world than scandinavians. there are as many gujjars in india as there are scandinavians in the world. the swedes, the finns and the danes etc have their own nations, the gujjars are a part of india (and pakistan). or 2.2 of 100 parts of india. now, consider this: how would the swedes, or the finns or the danes etc feel if they were ruled by a government in which they had no more than, let's say, 5% representation?

0.11%, or 5% of their proportion in the national population - that's an objective estimate of the gujjar representation in the central government and public sector jobs, in my view, considering all the obcs together have 5% representation. now, look at the brahmins: they probably constitute around 30% of the central government. there are probably 30% more brahmins in the country than gujjars- does that account for the difference in the representation figures? you'd require a gautierian imagination to even attempt to answer that.

oh yes, they're probably better represented in the rajasthan government, but still not adequately, as the protests tell us. but several columnists, analysts, professors, countless articulate others will tell you the gujjars are a key component of the variously labeled and greatly reviled upper obcs. the buffalo nation. grown prosperous from the green revolution and now looking to secure urban assets like government and public sector jobs. jobs which actually have shrunk by more than a million in the last one decade. . yes, they're so prosperous that they squat on railway tracks and roads in 45 degrees centigrade and let the police shoot them down. that's stupid? yes, prosperous and stupid and dead gujjars don't deserve any sympathy. or candles.

now, consider this too: if the gujjars had their own nation, their own membership in the u.n., wouldn't bolivia and vietnam have stood up for them? stupid bolivians and vietnamese.

now, please, consider this too: would it be possible for lower obc communities, ranging from one tenth to one-hundredth (or less) the size of the gujjars to even dare think of persuading bolivia and vietnam to push for their membership in the u.n?

the congress' end is the bjp's end is the communists' end

the karnataka poll results remind me of a few weeks old post, on by-polls in a few u.p., assembly constituencies, by adnan- an excerpt:

Amid the blue hue that has swept UP, the humiliating defeat of BJP and its absolute marginalisation in the state has been totally overlooked.

In the three Assembly by-polls, the share of votes in Muradnagar, Colonelganj and Bilgram, the party has been extraordinary low. It could get just 1.35%, 3% and 5% votes in the elections, the results for which were announced two days back. The BSP won all the three constituences, as also the two Lok Sabha seats. Surprisingly, the Lotus has wilted in the state where it emerged in the mid-80s pitting Hindus and Muslims against each other. And today it seems both Hindus and Muslims have forgotten this party in India's most populous state.

well, as adnan points out, the four weeks old good news is: the bjp seems to be dying in uttar pradesh. and the bad news, fresh off the presses, is: the bjp has emerged a winner in karnataka, on its own.

i know analysts would interpret the bjp's diminishing stature in u.p., as a triumph of the ordinary indian's secular spirit, and the karnataka results as a major threat to the health of the ordinary indian's secular spirit. in most liberal analysts' minds, the fortunes of secularism in the country are inextricably linked with the fortunes of the congress, the bjp and the communists, the national parties.

how true or tenable is that theory?

if you look at the recent communal history of u.p., and of tamil nadu, you'll notice two similarities: a) the significant absence (or insignificant presence) of the congress, the communists and the bjp in those states and b) the significant absence (or insignificant presence) of communal strife in those two states.

what does that tell you? the indian liberal doesn't usually connect those two phenomena in the way i am going to now: i believe that (a) leads to (b). none of those three national political parties/groups are secular on caste, so i don't think they can be secular on religious issues.

which means the bjp is dying in u.p, because the congress is already dead in the state. and the congress is dead because there are no communists in the state. similarly, in tamil nadu, however hard it may struggle, the bjp has very little chance of creating any waves as long as the congress has very little chance of reviving itself. and again, there are no communists in tamil nadu. what do all these factors add up to? peace across religions. or near total peace across religions.

and peace across castes? caste is much older than the religious divide, so it'd be a longer struggle. and karnataka is essentially playing out struggles against caste. the marginalized castes in india have been voting for alternatives in every election since the sixties, voting in those who seemed to be secular (on caste issues), and voting those alternatives out again when they realized they were not as secular as they seemed (on caste issues)- the process started earlier in some states. this opened opportunities for the janata parties in the seventies and eighties and the bjp later. u.p, tried both the janata parties/dal and the bjp, karnataka flirted with only the janata dal. it has voted for the bjp now- which essentially means, this is the beginning of the end of the congress. and then of the bjp in karnataka, eventually.

here's some advice for the upper caste, indian liberal: true secularism begins at home. check how secular the track record of y.s. rajashekhar reddy, chief minister of the only congress ruled state in south india is. i haven't read a single liberal analyst in the country expressing doubts about his secular credentials until now- but most of them, i do remember, celebrated the return of the congress in the state as a great victory for the secular forces in the country. here's an indicator of how non-secular his government actually is: a majority of top posts in corporations, autonomous oganizations functioning under the aegis of the state government, are occupied by reddies: how secular is that? the marginalized castes don't like this reddy raj which seems to be much more disgusting than the kamma raj of the naidu government earlier. some of them are preparing to vote for new, little known alternatives like the actor chiranjeevi's party- no, he hasn't launched it yet. yes, the marginalized castes are that desperate.

the marginalized castes in india don't understand secularism in the same way as the liberal does. and the secular liberal, of course, isn't interested in the marginalized castes' understanding of these issues. so he doesn't understand that the dalit who voted for the bjp in the recent polls didn't actually vote for hindutva. he was looking for secular (on caste issues) alternatives to the parties that had ruled until now: so, in the not so distant future, when he realizes that the bjp too is not so secular (as he definitely will), he will vote for another, untried alternative. and this will go on...

t.r.baalu, thevar or brahmin?

was caste conceived in a world of shortages? india still faces shortages in many fields: is that the reason why caste works so well today? nearly half the country still doesn't have regular access to electricity, and almost all gas based plants in the country are hungry for fuel. the babus from the former soviet union would know better about how goods and services get distributed when they're rationed out- the weak stay in the lines, forever, while the powerful get those goods without ever stepping into any line. our own planning commission would also know a lot about it: the government stores enough food in its godowns, for everyone, but the poor never get enough.

if the true principle of socialism is the elimination of hierarchy, caste espouses the merits of hierarchy. if socialism is about equality, caste is about separation. then why, in practice, do both end up looking like each other? the problem is with looking at hierarchy and separation separately: hierarchy would remain as long as there is separation, or inequality, and not just along class lines, but along ethnicities. and if you wish to eliminate ethnic divisions, say, which ones would you eliminate, first? yeah, hierarchy. across the world, people progress towards democracy by eliminating the nobility first. physically, or by stripping them of all privileges. is it possible in the hindu world? prachanda is trying to do that in nepal? yeah, with a tilak, most probably applied by a brahmin, on his forehead. i don't think i've seen an image more loaded with irony, hypocrisy and deceit in recent times.

coming back to the original question: when gas is rationed out, would the rationing work in any other way? and should t.r.baalu feel guilty about jumping the line? he says, he did it for the shareholders. that's a secular reason the prime minister finds nothing wrong with. did t.r.baalu act out of secular motivations? his grihastha dharma enjoins him to focus on his extended family first, the world later. that's what he was doing. if a hypocritical democracy finds comfort in secular excuses- interests of cheated shareholders must be good enough.

if nepal wishes to promote equality, it should start thinking of eliminating the privileges of those at the top (and not merely those, nominally, at the top), first. would there be any lower castes without any upper castes? and if the dmk, a party that has long championed the cause of social justice and reform, wishes to destroy the caste system it can't harbour members such as t.r.baalu who practise caste so very openly. hell, it can't harbour even folks such as karunanidhi. every secular excuse that they offer in defense of according special privileges to their kin would strengthen caste. special privileges and hierarchy go together- if you acquiesce to a system of privileging, you would consolidate the position of those at the top of the order, more than justify their practice of caste, and not bring them down.

a lot of champions of lower caste politics, especially those of the obc kind, act like fools cutting down branches of the trees they're sitting on. if you're a thevar seeking special privileges for your kin, you're not just separating yourself from others lower down in the hierarchy, you're also separating yourself from other thevars, less fortunate than you. will your actions, in any fashion, dent the whole hierarchical order? no, they will only strengthen it. other thevars would find it that much more difficult to secure their rights, forget privileges, because those traditionally at the top would not need any excuses to continue to practise caste. remember, their right to privileges is divinely ordained while your right to equality is the result of secular, democratic struggles. when you uphold privileges, don't you strengthen the divine writ (and weaken your secular right to equality)? how can you begin to question their privileges when you seem to accept, willingly, other portions of the divine writ?

everyone should look after their own kind, right? first the kul, or the family, then the jati, then the varna and finally, if there's any time left, the world. as long as you defend privileges, mr.baalu, you defend caste. and as long as you defend caste, don't nurse any illusions that you can always secure all your rights. there'd be other people stealing your rights most of the rest of your life, who wouldn't even need to defend their actions: caste has already accorded them privileged positions.

lastly, those thevars who show scant respect for the dalits, lower down the caste order, aren't very different from baalu, are they? someone would always reign over them as long as they try to reign over the dalits.

the larger picture: the state's missing

Any OBC family with an annual income above Rs 2.5 lakh would be treated as part of the creamy layer. Families where the key bread-earner is either a doctor, engineer, lawyer, son of present or past MP and MLA or working in 11 equivalent professions will also be part of the creamy layer.

The verdict has set off a demand among regional parties that the creamy layer criteria be changed.

from what would perhaps be called an incisive news report in the telegraph (italics mine). if the reporter had bothered to check the creamy layer categories and criteria (read appendix x in this ncbc annual report) a little more carefully, he'd have realized that not all obc doctors, lawyers, engineers fall in the creamy layer category. nor do all past mps, mlas and others working in 11 equivalent positions- the income criteria would apply to every one of them.

it's not just the upper caste dominated academia that does shoddy work- the media overdoes it all the time. all their reporting/analysis of dalit/obc issues displays a poor grasp of facts, an unwholesome appetite for drama and a penchant for sweeping conclusions. is this how the reporter's mind worked? 1) obcs: largely undeserving, 2) hence, large creamy layer 3) therefore, large-scale discontent. how many obcs could the reporter have possibly met in such a large state (both in terms of population and size) as uttar pradesh, keeping in view that the deadlines on such issues are possibly shorter, to draw such a large picture?

here's a part of the larger picture of the obcs: according to the third census of the small scale industries in the country, 57 % of the unregistered 91, 46, 216 ssi units in india were managed by businessmen or entrepreneurs from the socially backward classes.

that little factoid, along with other information i've discussed in my earlier posts, should tell you a lot of things about the obcs- but i do hope you've noticed one significant feature that characterizes their existence: i refer to their relationship with the state. it's very tenuous. the state would like to ignore them, mostly, and they'd like to keep away from it, mostly.

and another feature that i'd also like to point out: agriculture is not the whole of their culture.

this is what i mean by jnu gyan

check this interesting article by chandrabhan prasad: a critique of buffalo nationalism that kancha ilaiah seeks to promote. i'd not like to attempt here a critique of the critique (i think it'd be useful), but i'd definitely like to point out some factual inaccuracies and inconsistencies that many knowledgeable folks from indian academia seem to consistently indulge in. especially those articulate folks who work, or have spent a few years (like prasad), in jnu.

for instance, the jats. the jats from uttar pradesh are not obcs- not according to the national commission for backward classes (check the u.p. list). neither are the jats from punjab. nor haryana. only the jats from rajasthan (excluding jats from bharatpur and dhaulpur districts, where nearly half of the state's jats live) are in the central list of backward classes.

which means around 95% of the jats in the country are not obcs. which also means: the jats cannot be taken to represent the obcs.

let me quote here a paragraph from this excellent article, in frontline, on why some jats from rajasthan are in the central list):

The NCBC further reasoned in its advice: “No doubt, after the effective abolition of jagirdari and zamindari systems, the condition of Jats in Rajasthan have begun to improve, but considering the time-span required for advancement of a community as a whole from a position of backwardness, the time that was available for Jats in Rajasthan (excluding Bharatpur and Dholpur) to move up from a position of social backwardness to that of social advancement, cannot be reasonably considered as adequate. The exceptional circumstances dating at least from the late medieval age through the modern period, which were available for communities like Kamma and Reddy of Andhra Pradesh and the Jats of Punjab, etc., have not been available for Jats of Rajasthan (excluding Bharatpur and Dholpur). (italics mine)

so, if you wish to place the jats in any category, place them alongside the reddies and kammas of andhra pradesh, or the marathas of maharashtra or the patidars of gujarat. they don't belong in the obc category. their ascendancy- social, economic, political- is not recent: it has been happening over the last three, four centuries at least. and in the non-aryavarta states, these castes have emerged, as if naturally, to assume the place of the absent kshatriyas.

call them the intermediate or intermediary castes, or the middle castes: in most indian states they're the upper castes. but that news doesn't seem to have reached jnu until now. for a lot of the tv stars from jnu, and other universities across india, the intermediate castes (or upper castes not of upper varna origin) are quintessential obcs.

there is not just socio-economic, but also a consistent historical logic to the castes in the central list. it's another matter that there have been reports from some state commissions for backward classes that have found inconsistencies pertaining to a few castes in the respective states' lists (but not in the central list). prominent among doubtful inclusions are a couple of castes from tamil nadu and karnataka and uttar pradesh. but by and large, there have been more, many more, non-inclusions, of small unknown castes, than inclusions, of large, prominent castes.

look at this way: if the obc population of india, let's assume, is around 50 crores. what would be the average size, in terms of population, of the 2000 odd obc castes? around 2,50,000. if we exclude those few castes whose numbers run into lakhs and a few times, a couple of millions, what would be average size of the average obc caste? many wouldn't even reach the one lakh mark. no, you've never really met the average obc, even though you've met him hundreds of times: he might be the hawker who sells vegetables at your door, the janitor in the lift, the plumber or the electrician, the thelawallah selling plastic goods, the mechanic, the paanwallah...but how would you recognize him if he isn't a yadav or a jat or a kurmi or a lodh? most likely, not even the government has heard of the name of the plumber/electrician/janitor's caste.

why does the focus of the committed academia (and the media and most of the chattering classes who follow their performances in the media) in india remain fixed on the few prominent intermediate castes at the top of the social order in many states, historically, even when most of them are not even obcs, according to the ncbc? considering, even those among them who are obcs, probably constitute around 5% of the obc population in the country, and less than 1% of all obc castes?

and the popular myths propagated by this set of jnu led dons is based on such poor research- it's ages since most of them have actually done any field work, i think. most of the best research has been done by researchers from outside india. and even when they do do field work: they seem to know beforehand what to find.

the majority is the creamy layer

i have gone back to this paper (that i found here, ), Caste and democracy: Reservations and the return to politics by Susie Tharu, M. Madhava Prasad, Rekha Pappu, K. Satyanarayana, quite often in the past few months. yes, it does articulate some scholarly insights that seem to reflect some of my own not-so-scholarly views. abi's answer prompted this latest excursion:

Thus an entire range of contributions is marked by one shared presupposition: that there exists a coherent and hegemonic political subject who is interested simultaneously in maintaining the standards of merit and excellence naturally assumed to be of primary interest to a majority, and rendering social justice to the rest (assumed to be a “minority”) through policies of positive discrimination. In keeping with this strict policy orientation, these arguments rarely pause to question the categories such as majority and minority that are fundamental to the very possibility of such an orientation. While some have noted that the ‘general category’ itself functions as reservation for the upper castes (Ghosh), the political significance of the fact that this “majority” which is fabricated by negation and represented symbolically by the 50 percent limit on reservations, is an artificial majority without demographic or political foundation, is rarely discussed.

the debate was over a policy that the majority needed to be convinced about: the government was convinced, but the majority would rather believe in the courts, in this particular instance. so the court spoke for them. where does the minority come into the picture?

the debate was about the efficiency of the policy:

The primary orientation of the debate is toward policy, and the discourse is strewn with terms like costs, benefits, efficiency, and with demands for more accurate information about population segments, and a multiplicity of other factors that affect access to opportunities, etc. They remain within an academic-bureaucratic framework where the question of the right policy measures is already assumed to be the shared ground on which to stage the debate. They have differences about what policies should be adopted, but rarely do they question the assumption that what we have here is basically a question of policy.

i guess the americans, ranged on opposing sides, were as vocal about their government's policy on iraq. and the chinese, though not overtly, are as engaged over the autonomous region of tibet. but somewhere in the back of their minds, the iraqis and tibetans do figure, i'm sure. what occupied/s the minds of the majority in india is deprivation, not obcs:

The shift from discrimination—which points to social divisions with structural consequences—to deprivation—a lack that may be compensated—is symptomatic of the policy approach. The policy approach does not examine social divisions or inquire into the consequences for an understanding of Indian society/democracy. It attempts to find a solution to a crisis. The fundamental question is: how do the state and its advisors perceive the crisis generated by the struggle for reservations, and, by contrast, how might it be perceived from the point of view of a democracy to come? (italics mine)

the americans wanted to deliver democracy to the iraqis (by invading their country), the chinese want to take the tibetans along on the road to progress (by flooding the region with prosperous chinese)- what does the majority in india wish to address through reservations? deprivation, not caste. and the court has sought to reassure the majority that they shall indeed address deprivation: check this news report on how the majority is still not convinced that the government, a political creature, will implement the verdict 'in its right spirit' (they would dilute the creamy layer!):

If there is one community, then within that community what would count as an indicator of social distress or disadvantage to be remedied would be economic, i.e., that which can be brought under a common measure. If on the other hand there are many communities, and their separate existence is taken as the starting point, then the application of a common measure is out of the question. A single community – such as a homogeneous national community – would take account of the distress of its own members and seek to redress it. It would not then be a matter of providing for reservations, but of acting to relieve distress with effective measures. If then, there are reservations in a nation-state, we can read this as a sign that there is no unified community that coincides with the national population.

there were two major arguments thrust before the court: a) many of the castes included in the lists might not be as deprived as they were in 1931, b) many individuals among those castes were not as deprived as in 1980. primarily, the court was asked to verify claims of deprivation. the court ordered a review, every five years, of the level of deprivation of castes in the list [seeing merit in argument (a)] and the exclusion of the creamy layer [upholding argument (b)] . clearly, the objective was to prevent the few from cornering the rights of the many (what was the evidence before the court to substantiate this fear?)

why didn't the court ponder over the question: how can the majority be prevented from cornering the rights of the castes/communities that have been compressed into a deprived minority? the need for reservations itself constitutes sufficient evidence on that issue. that question was not answered in 1993 too. nor in 1947.

the creamy layer score card: one department, two ministries, four culprits

indian identity is forged in diversity, says shashi tharoor:

Worse, this stock Hindu male has only to mingle with the polyglot, multicoloured crowds - and I am referring not to the colours of their clothes but to the colours of their skins - thronging any of India's major railway stations to realise how much of a minority he really is. Even his Hinduism is no guarantee of his majorityhood, because caste divisions automatically put him in a minority. (If he is a Brahmin, for instance, 90% of his fellow Indians are not.)

if this stock hindu male, let's assume he is a brahmin, were to visit the offices of the ministry of mines, government of india, he'd find every guarantee of his majorityhood at most desks.

the ministry of mines, like the department of fertilizers, has only one obc in a creamy layer position: one group (b) officer among 63 group (a) and (b) officers. (check chapter 2 of the ministry's 2007-08 annual report.)

shashi tharoor had also written a book on nehru, the statesman who dropped the phrase 'unity in diversity' almost as often as he made close/distant/unknown kashmiri pundit relatives top bureaucrats, intelligence chiefs, diplomats, governors. that's a cheap shot at a dead man? well, the dead man started it. he was not so dead, and mostly, stark raving statesmanlike when he told the country's chief ministers he didn't want to 'swamp the bright and able people and remain second-rate or third-rate' around fifty years ago. and almost thirty years later, rajeev gandhi quoted his grandfather's argument in parliament. and fifteen years ago when the creamy layer was defined: wasn't that a cheap shot too?

the ministry of mines, one notices, doesn't want to 'swamp the bright and able people and remain second-rate or third-rate', either. yes, it's an ethic the indian state has consistently adhered to over half a century. actually, it's more than an ethic- it seems to be one of the most important guiding principles of the indian state.

do colours have a place in nehru's/indira's/rajeev's/sonia's india? the materials that went into forging india and the indian identity weren't 'second rate or third rate'. they were, with insignificant exceptions, first rate. therefore, no one who is 'second rate or third rate' is indian. india, through all the defining and redefining since independence, has shown itself incapable of accepting a little more than a tiny cluster of 'multicoloured crowds' in its fold. in india, the majority can only be a minority. it's time, i think, the 'second rate or third rate' started thinking of giving up knocking at india's doors.

two more for the creamy layer

the ministry of steel is one better than the department of fertilizers: it can boast of two obcs of the creamy layer kind and not a measly one!

check the annual report (2006-07, the latest) of the ministry of steel (pages 50-54), government of india: of the 151 group (a) and (b) officers in the ministry, only two are obcs.

and the rest of the (chapter IX) of the report, which deals with 'welfare of weaker sections of society', tells you how creative babus, who everyone presumes lead such dull lives, can be. and also reveals the depth of the great contempt the managing babus of these companies have for reservations policies in general, and for the reserved classes in particular: of the nine psus the ministry controls, only four give you the actual number of obcs they employ, of which only two list out the group-wise numbers of employees!
here's an overview:

* s.a.i.l: employs 1,35,028 people, of whom nearly 61,000 are group (a) and (b) officers. and how many of those officers are obcs? the steel giant doesn't seem to have heard of the obcs. the dalits and adivasis are there, but significantly underrepresented.

* rashtriya ispat nigam ltd (r.i.n.l): employs 16,453 people, of whom around 6,100 are group (a) and (b) officers. how many are obcs? the company seems to have already started implementing the sachar committee recommendations: it lists 'minority' representation in employment but mentions no obcs. seems to have heard of them only recently because it talks about recruiting 6 obc employees in the group (c) category (not creamy layer) in 2006-07- yes, thirteen years after the supreme court discovered the creamy layer.

* kudremukh iron ore company ltd (k.i.o.c.l): employs 1548 people, of whom 219 are obcs. no mention of group-wise employment.

* national mineral development corporation (n.m.d.c): employs 5,532 people, of whom 2,000 (approx.,) are group (a) and (b) officers. obcs? finally, we notice their presence- 153 (out total 2,000, approx., officers) of them are group (a) and (b) officers (or 7.65% of all officers).

* manganese ore (india) ltd (m.o.i.l): mentions no numbers at all! but 'has undertaken several measures for the welfare of sc/st/obc section of society such as: a) adoption of tribal villages, b) training in sericulture for economic development), c) help to the schools insurrounding mines' etc.,

* bird group of companies: mentions only percentages and no figures. says 11% of its employees are obcs. how many of them are group (a) and (b) officers? if the company liked the figures, why would it hide behind percentages?

* mstc ltd: mentions both figures and percentages. it employs 301 people, of whom 254 are group (a) and (b) officers. how many are obcs? 18 (7% of total number of officers).

* sponge iron india ltd (s.i.i.l): mentions neither figures nor percentages. nor obcs.

* mecon ltd: employs 1,618 people, of whom 132 are obcs. how many of them are group (a) and (b) officers? doesn't list out group-wise figures.

forget the creamy layer, do you even get any sense that such a people as the obcs are actually a part of this country from the above listing of facts?

i'd talked of the babus who manage these companies, and their contempt for reservations policies earlier: do you see it now? sixty years after reservations for the sc/sts came into effect, some of these companies do not even bother to mention how many dalits and adivasis they employ! and the figures they do mention, many times, are obviously not very credible. many dalit activists have written about and agitated against the fudging of facts and figures by government ministries, departments and psus at many levels. do you understand their frustration now? transparency? who can force these babus to be more transparent? the government couldn't make their kids budge off the aiims grounds for weeks. corporate social responsibility? oh yes, most of these companies' websites have long pages devoted to it.

and to think that the lower castes too paid for the investments that built these companies.