no mantras or miracles will work here

had started on this draft in march 2010:

here, at the Indian Farmers' website, you'll find this article (word document): 'Status Paper on Rice'. on page 13 and 14, you'll find a detailed breakdown of all the costs involved in producing rice. and the concluding part says:

YIELD, COST OF CULTIVATION PER QUINTAL AND INCOME

(a) Cost of cultivation per acre Rs. 25000/-

(b) Average yield of paddy per acre is 25 quintals (35 bags)

(c) Cost of cultivation per Quintal (Rs. 25000¬ /25) = Rs. 1000/-

(d) MSP fixed for paddy per quintal is Rs. 745 (for the year 2007-08)

(e) Total gross income (Rs.745 X 25 quintals) =Rs.18,625/-

(f) Estimated loss per acre to the farmer (Rs.25,000 – Rs.18,625/-) = Rs 6,375/-(g) MSP to be fixed as per Prof. M.S. Swaminathan Commission

recommendation should be Rs.1,500 per quintal (Cost of cultivation + add minimum 50% of cost of cultivation i.e. Rs.1000+500=Rs.1,500)

those are average costs for producing rice across andhra pradesh in the year 2008-09. also note that the m.s.swaminathan commission's recommendation for increasing the minimum support price upto rs.1500 (or, Cost of cultivation + add minimum 50% of cost of cultivation), made in 2007, has not been adopted until now.

illusory potential

1) the m.s.p. for rice in the current year is rs. 950 for common variety and rs.980 for higher grade plus an 'incentive bonus' of rs.50 (which is temporary and could be withdrawn next year). so how much could a farmer producing 25 quintals an acre, earn per acre now? nothing. the costs (rs.25,000 per acre) would equal the returns (rs.1,000 x 25 quintals). which means the majority (60% of all farmers) of farmers in the state of andhra pradesh, or the marginal farmers (average landholding size: around an acre), would earn nothing.

2) less than 20% of farmers in andhra pradesh own 3.5 acres or more each. and those are 1995-96 estimates when average landholding size was 1.36 hectares, or 3.35 acres. in 2005-06, it was 1.20 hectares or 2.96 acres. the average income of the average paddy farmer* now would be around zero, if the m.s.p., remains at around rs.1,000 (at an average productivity rate of 25 quintals an acre), because the costs (rs. 25,000 per acre x 2.96 or 3 acres) would equal the returns (rs. 1,000 per quintal x 25 quintals per acre x 3 acres).

3) what if the m.s.p were increased to rs. 1,500? the average paddy farmer with a landholding of 2.96 acres would make around (rs. 1,500 per quintal x 25 quintals per acre x 3 acres) rs. 1,12,500 which would yield him a net income of (rs. 1,12, 500 minus costs of rs.75,000) of rs. 37, 500. the per capita income of his family members (assuming a family size of 5) would be around rs. 7,500, or less than one-third the per capita income of rs. 23,729 (in 2004-05, at current prices) of the state.

4) who would benefit if support prices are increased to the level suggested by swaminathan? less than 6% of the state's paddy farmers, or those who own more than 10 acres each. each farmer who owns more than 10 acres, would earn an income of around rs. 1,25,000 (rs.37,500 per acre x 10 acres minus costs of rs.25,000 per acre x 10 acres). the per capita income in his family would be around rs.25,000 or slightly more than the state average.

5) how about the majority, or the marginal farmers? the marginal paddy farmer would make around rs.37,500 (rs.1,500 per quintal x 25 quintals) and earn an income rs. 12,500 (rs. 37,500 minus costs of rs. 25,000 an acre). that means per capita income of each member of his family will be rs. 2,500, or slightly more than one-tenth the per capita income in the state.

6) what if every paddy farmer in the state managed to double the yield: from 25 quintals an acre to 50 quintals an acre? let's assume he doesn't have to incur any new capital costs and input costs to increase the yield by such magnitude, and he's able to manage the feat by sheer good luck. how much will the marginal farmer be able to make in the new scenario? his income from each acre will be (rs.1,500 x 50 quintals = rs.75,000 minus costs of rs 25,000= 50,000). which means per capita incomes in his family would be less than half the state average. how much will the average paddy farmer (landholding: 2.96 or 3 acres) make? rs.1,50,000 (rs. 1,500 per quintal x 50 quintals per acre x 3 acres minus costs of rs. 25,000 per acre x 3 acres). which means per capita income of his family would rise above the state average by around 25%.

but that would depend on three miracles happening simultaneously:

i) m.s.p. going up by more than 50% in one year. average annual growth in m.s.p in the last two decades has been less than 10%.

ii) average yield per acre going up by more than 100% in one year. average annual growth rate in yield in the past four decades has been much lower than 2%. 

iii) there would be no need for fresh capital investment and also no increase in input costs.

even if all those three miracles do happen, simultaneously, over 60% of the farmers in the state (the marginal farmers) would still earn incomes of around rs.50,000 which would still mean per capita incomes in their families would still be less than half the state average. and the small farmers, another 20%, would be earning significantly more. the medium farmers, another 15%, would be doing even better. which means 60% of the paddy farmers in andhra pradesh wouldn't benefit much even from the miraculous scenario which offers i) a 50% increase in minimum support prices immediately and ii) doubling of yields iii) and a zero percent increase in input costs.

is there really a point in further speculating on what would the farmers earn if the minimum support prices were doubled to rs.2,000?
----------------------------------------------------

as i mentioned earlier, i wrote that draft over an year ago. now, minimum support prices have gone up slightly: rs.1,030 for grade 'a' variety and rs.1,000 for other varieties. which means the conclusions i'd drawn on all the  6 scenarios presented still hold true. and only scenarios (1) and (2) reflect the current reality as you know. (3), (4), (5) and (6) represent hypothetical scenarios. pipe-dreams which rest on miracles.

there are a couple of things one needs to know to understand how these farmers survive if the returns are so low or non-existent: the total estimate of costs listed in the status paper also includes a 'land lease' component: rs.7,000 for an acre. this is what the owner-cultivator would save, but the tenant farmer would be deprived even of that. also, a certain percentage of the farmers also go in for a second crop. but that wouldn't make a great difference in their incomes, i think, because most of the costs would have to be incurred again.

the high priests of 'food security' aren't thinking about all that i guess. as i said in my previous post, there seems to be a strong belief among them that these are manageable problems. that a few wise interventions like increasing support prices, subsidies and agricultural extension etc would improve productivity, which is a primary concern for them, and also somehow give the farmer greater returns.. from sainath to jayathi ghosh, everyone's been reeling out those mantras. but the stupid shudras have a saying: mantraalaku chintakaayalu raalavu. which means, roughly: the tamarind tree wouldn't shed its fruits for mantras.

from swaminathan to sainath, they've been spouting these mantras for many years now. i don't doubt their sympathy for the farmers. but i'm convinced, seven years after the congress was re-elected promising succour for the farmers (one of its main election planks) and seven more years of unabated chanting of mantras, that they probably think of the farmer as some kind of a lifeless cog in a vast system of machinery that's not working as per their grand designs. the cog's problems matter only so far as they affect the working of the machinery.

lastly, according to some latest observations in the media, the costs of cultivating each acre have gone upto rs.30,000. even if all those estimates are wrong by even a significant percentage, say 20 or 30 or even 50, i don't see how it will change that overall inexorable reality. 

no phule, no ambedkar..

..no ayyankali, narayana guru, periyar or even lohia either. and definitely no kanshi ram. no mayawati. or annadurai or even devraj urs or laloo yadav. one notices the glaring absence of a long, sustained anti-caste, mass movement in the political history of colonial and post-colonial andhra pradesh.

in the last two centuries, the telugus have produced many thinkers, writers and political activists who had risen against many kinds of oppression -- against feudal rule in telangana, against colonial rule and against zamindaries in coastal andhra and rayalaseema, against exploitation of adivasis in telangana and coastal andhra.

but there has never been a large, sustained, mass movement against caste and brahminism in recent history.

caste wasn't the primary focus of either the telangana peasants struggle, the biggest militant movement of its kind in 20th century indian history, or of the four decades old naxalite movement, both of which produced thousands of dalitbahujan martyrs.

there have been many movements, agitations against caste based oppression but none challenged caste like the movements led by all the visionaries i named earlier. now some dalitbahujan supporters of telangana think that a sociopolitical transformation will happen in a separate state because the population of the obcs in telangana is a few percentage points higher than in a united state. add to this irrational belief in the 'magical solution' of telangana the conviction that upper caste brahmin, velama and reddy politicians and intellectuals will help produce not only the 'magical' solution but also perhaps the social transformation later: is there anything illogical in the srikrishna committee report's dismissal of the idea?   

raising mass consciousness, even at the political level, against caste is a long, tough job. ask dr.ambedkar. if you can't go so far back in the past, ask kanshi ram who walked, cycled around a much larger state than telangana and andhra pradesh for nearly two decades before he got anywhere close to his objective.

and while dalitbahujan youth participate in large numbers in the agitation, nursing their beliefs, hapless dalits are being hunted down as witches in villages close to even the state capital. adivasi girls are being killed or being sold.

will the upper caste politicians or intellectuals/activists leading the movement exhibit the same spirit of brotherhood towards the 'impure' classes if the dalitbahujan youth started asking questions about the upper caste hunters of witches and sorcerers in choutuppal and elsewhere?

dr.ambedkar didn't wait for independence or political 'freedom' to press his demands for the protection of the depressed classes.

but these bands of dalitbahujan supporters will wait for the 'magical solution' that'd first empower the obcs, supposedly, and then the dalits. has the empowerment of a few obc communities, as in u.p., tamil nadu or karnataka ever ensured better progress in the war against caste? political empowerment of a few obc communities has never meant broad political empowerment even of all the obcs, leave alone the dalits. and substantial social transformation is still a long way off in all those states. and the valuable lesson we've learnt from all those states is that it is the empowerment of the dalits that should be the primary goal of any sociopolitical  movement that challenges caste: because any anti-caste political movement that is led by a few obc communities (like the yadavs, kurmis, mudaliars, gounders, vanniars, vokkaligas etc) shall ultimately result in only reinforcing caste, by only slightly altering the hierarchy.

i hope they'll revisit kanshi ram.

the price of magical solutions

he's mostly been moonlighting as a politician, and not even for a very long period. until one year or so ago, he was a full-time businessman, or robber baron (as some critics would call him). look what he has to say to the 125 year old congress:

Jagan openly mocked at the Congress and the state government in Andhra Pradesh. “I am doing Congress a favour by asking my supporters (MLAs) not to resign. Had I wanted, I could have done it a long time ago. I am a gentleman. So I am doing a favour to the Congress party.” He did not mince any words in making his intentions clear.

for the first time in its long history, the congress must be feeling very sorry that it is in power in andhra pradesh. i don't think such a situation had ever risen in any other state, for that matter, in the past. given a chance, it'd rather be in the opposition benches again, i think, stoke wild aspirations and make vague promises about a new state, and win elections as it did in 2004. yes, given a chance, it'd definitely like to go back to 2004. given a chance, i think, it'd prefer to roll over and die now. but it seems like jagan and many others wouldn't give it even that chance.

dangling 'magical solutions' before the masses could ensure some temporary successes -- you tell jobseekers telangana would give you jobs, you tell farmers telangana would give you water, you tell the poor telangana would bring you wealth, you tell everyone telangana would bring you everything-- like an election or two. but when the masses come to collect, you can't tell them that there are no magical solutions. that you'd been fooling them all along.

the congress can't choose the srikrishna committee's best option, united andhra pradesh, and garner winning votes in telangana for some time. it can't choose the second best option, bifurcation, and hope to survive in coastal andhra and rayalaseema. but how did the congress manage to so dexterously antagonise people of all regions? even now, it's not the anger of the people it's worried about, it's the displeasure of the dominant caste groups in the state that worries it. 

i am not predicting that the congress would die in andhra pradesh. only that congressmen would disappear in droves into jagan's mob, or the trs for a while or... the survival of the congress until now has always depended on how happy it could keep the dominant castes in the state, distributing power and pelf evenly between regions, more or less. so the dominant castes in andhra were okay with telangana as long as it remained an election promise, but when the dominant castes in telangana saw in this promise an opportunity to corner all power over the economic 'engine' of the state, hyderabad, the entente between both groups started getting weaker. but i think the weakening of the alliance between the dominant groups in the state is temporary: they've many common social and economic interests. but what has suffered more grievous damage is the congress's reputation as an arbiter, a keeper of peace and balance, among these groups. the telugu desam, 25 years ago, had won the confidence of at least one group among these castes and managed to also groom leaders from among a sizeable section of the backward castes. the tdp too would suffer now because, as the srikrishna committee has observed, 3-4 large backward castes are also seeking a firmer place among the dominant groups. 

what was the telangana movement all about? it was, like i always said, about power-sharing. not about neglect, or poverty, or discrimination or colonization. certainly not about the people.

the union is a coalition of estates

a. raja is being thrown out, but not the dmk. that's an important lesson for the dalitbahujans of telangana, andhra pradesh and india: geographic boundaries don't divide the social/economic elite politically. if anything, they succeed in dividing the dalitbahujans more.

mostly thinking aloud:

it's quite possible that a. raja's crimes are far less grave than his predecessors' ( arun shourie, pramod mahajan and dayanidhi maran ) misdeeds. or far more, as most other news stories seem to say. it's definitely possible that raja was not acting alone, that his masters in the dmk, and the congress, are equally involved. but in the eyes of the elite-- political, economic and social elite-- only raja is dispensable.

political democracy, as dr. ambedkar pointed out, does not ensure social or economic freedom. nominal recognition of the right to representation of the dalits through reserved constituencies has not produced a class of politicians who embody politics wedded to the ideals of dalit freedom, socially and economically. the political class (across parties) representing the brahminized classes, on the other hand, functions quite smoothly in concert with the social and economic elite of the country. from industry to big media to the intellectual classes in universities and elsewhere: the brahminized classes are overrepresented in all those areas. so, it'd have been tough to remove shourie or mahajan or even maran, because sizeable sections among the media, 'civil' society etc would have risen in support.

with the dalitbahujan presence in industry, or the media or the academia etc., being insignificant, what kind of support can dalit politicians expect from them if they devoted themselves to a broad dalit vision of transforming society? none, of course. so it is easier for politicians like a. raja, devoted to someone else's politics, to cling to power than for some more sincere dalit politicians.

so, how is it possible for a party like the dmk, representing regional elite, to hold such power in the 'national' elite as to claim exclusive rights over certain chosen portfolios such as telecom? because the 'national' elite is nothing but a collection of regional elites. so x reddy, a prominent minister in the central cabinet, could have a problem with y mudaliar, another prominent minister, but that'd never become a reddy vs mudaliar conflict. because they have common economic and social interests. and they're both an accepted part of the broad national --political, social, economic-- elite because they both are regional-- political, economic, social-- elites.

the reddies, kammas and velamas etc, are joint title-holders to the jagir, or estate, of andhra pradesh, and are thus a part of the 'national' elite. you can't divide them politically by dividing the state, as some over-optimistic dalitbahujan activists have been theorizing, because they have common economic and social interests, broadly, and those interests shall always be protected at the national and regional level by the national elite. if the dalitbahujans of andhra pradesh, or any other state in india, wish to challenge the hegemony of the regional elite, they have to avoid thinking up elaborate strategies on how to divide the existing elite, and start focussing on how to unite the divided dalitbahujans. first and foremost.

why small states make better sense to politicians

srivatsa krishna, an indian administrative service officer, writes:

It is assumed ex ante, without any causal evidence, by several political leaders that smaller states make for better governance and superior economic performance. But does a Telangana being carved out of Andhra Pradesh (AP) automatically mean lesser transmission and distribution losses, and therefore, better electricity availability? Would a smaller state automatically improve attendance of school teachers and doctors in the villages? Would it automatically rein in the burgeoning fiscal deficit of state governments? We often tend to confuse a smaller state with greater local participation and thus greater accountability in the delivery of services, which may or may not be the case.

Also, a smaller state does not always mean a smaller government. In fact, at least in the short and medium term, the cost of administration will increase, for one would be duplicating a lot of the existing systems and resources in the new state. Thus, instead of “administrative convenience”, what one should be looking at is “administrative necessity”. What is the smallest and most effective size of government to deliver growth and development? Interestingly, there is no evidence in economic literature which consistently proves that government failure is costlier than market failure to the economic performance of a state. As such, it is facile to conclude a priori that a smaller or a bigger government is necessarily superior or inferior to the market, or vice versa. What has been seen to consistently matter is the quality of government intervention, and it is debatable whether this improves with the size of government or with the quality of leadership, as such evidence is still nascent and mixed. [emphasis mine].

the author asks: But does a Telangana being carved out of Andhra Pradesh (AP) automatically mean lesser transmission and distribution losses, and therefore, better electricity availability?

has anyone of the thinking heads among the separatists asked those kind of questions? the government of andhra pradesh says 100% of the villages have access to electricity, but in practice only around 50% of rural homes across the state have electricity.

Would a smaller state automatically improve attendance of school teachers and doctors in the villages? the truth is, the education system in no state in the country is capable of taking in all the children into schools and retain them for the nominal eight years that the rulers think is enough to call them literate. less than half of children enrolled in primary schools (check the number of children enrolled in primary schools in andhra pradesh here, and the total number of children in primary+ upper primary+ high schools here, note the discrepancy) ever go beyond middle school. and there aren't enough high schools to take in more children anyway. so the 'system' is designed to kick children out of school, it'd seem, progressively through all the primary school years and dramatically after middle school.

the number of primary health centres in andhra pradesh, according to the government, is 1570 for a rural population (assuming all those phcs operate in rural areas) of 5.5 crores. that means one doctor for around 35,000 population. but it usually works out to one doctor for 1 lakh population at best, taking into account unfilled posts and absenteeism. now, if half the telangani doctors in the united states and elsewhere now expressing support for a separate state returned and chose to work in villages in telangana, the doctor-patient ratio in the region would probably reach the level of such advanced nations as tanzania, mozambique or even uganda!

i don't think krishna's common sensical skepticism would dampen the separatists' belief in the magical powers of the small-is-beautiful-under-all-circumstances mantra. but krishna also naively questions the strength of this belief, and the motives of the most articulate believers :

The other aside, given the rapid deterioration of India in the Transparency International rankings, is whether the demand for smaller states is a guise for grabbing a larger share of a smaller kitty (as against a smaller share of a larger kitty) when it comes to rapacious rent-seeking by politicians—justified in the name of the “sentiments” of the people. There can be no end to primordial passions and one can justify on the ground of sentiment carving out of ever smaller states till such time that it becomes completely meaningless. All those giving the example of the US’ number of states should not forget that the states which are the economic dynamo of America are the larger ones such as California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and not Montana or Wyoming. Stellar research by Michael Porter at Harvard Business School indicates that within each country there are clusters—the US has at least 400—which are the engines propelling growth, and these are spread all across the US, not correlated to a big or small state.

please go read the article, if you haven't already. i agree with most of what he says, and he says it much better.

kans' computer

kans
had a computer
(why do you laugh)
menaka
got down from a 'helicopter'
in the kurukshetra
(please don't laugh)
where they didn't use nukes
(at krishna's command)
wasn't that good
or
wouldn't bharat's
nation have been wiped out?
you'll agree
we've long had telegraph
and widows*
ganda bherunda was our jet plane
it was called pushpak
i forgot
forgive me
just as kans had a computer
our vedas had marxism
believe it or not
(that's your karma)
if you think
our native toddy
is too potent
savour
the mixed cocktail
of our ancestors'
ghee-soaked lips!

my translation of sivasagar's kansuni computer. the original poem was written during the period of emergency in response to s.a.dange's, leader of the communist party of india, claims that the vedas (or the gita?) contained marxist ideas.

* one telugu word for widow is vithanthu which, sort of rhymes with thanthi, telugu for telegraph.

fluidity of the cesspool

once upon a time, not so long ago, educated hindus found a handy teddy bear in the theory of sanskritization. if a jati can move up the hierarchy by shedding its old, ugly customs and beliefs and adopting sanskritic mores, the caste system can't be so bad, right? it is flexible, allows mobility,. and what if the jatis themselves do not disappear, what's wrong if people still marry within their own jatis..look, these things exist in the west too, like in... (drop the name of an advanced western nation and mention how they still practice a certain kind of social stratification etc., here).

as i said, a handy teddy bear to help you comfort yourself, to ward off any demons that might hound your conscience. that'd help you dismiss any doubts about how would sanskritization promote substantive inclusiveness if you continue to practise caste in everything that you do. people do not flock to medaram to satisfy ancient, atavistic impulses. they go there because they do not feel included, and not just in the scriptural fold but also in the many structures and processes that govern this nation, and state. like i had pointed out here:

* there are 59 scheduled caste communities in andhra pradesh and no aspirant from over 50 of those communities has ever been elected to the state assembly (or council),
* the other backward class communities in the state number 93- no aspirant from over 70 of them has ever been elected to the state assembly (or council)

medaram, with all its superstition, represents the religions of these communities more than prayaga, with all its superstition. and these religions survive the steady onslaught of not just sanskritization, but also westernization, because their adherents haven't moved up. and they haven't moved up because the caste system still is what it always was: a hierarchical structure. which means only a few can occupy the top.

in my last post, i'd hinted that sanskritization did ensure mobility for a few communities across india, but taking into account the general status of the overwhelming majority of the castes broadly categorized as hindus one can clearly see that sanskritization doesn't ensure either mobilty or equality.

i found in this article by m.shahbaz saeed, a pakistani researcher, a useful explanation of how sanskritization worked and still works for the few communities ( 'intermediate castes', or 'middle castes' or 'upper-obcs' ) i'd mentioned in the last paragraph:

As the modern age has infringed on the classic Indian social order, the traditional Indian society has been transformed into the upper national elite living in urban areas, and the rural social elite, comprising both the dominant peasant castes and the upper rural class.The ruling national elites, although they belonged to the upper “dwija” castes, had become detached from their traditional ritual status and functions. They had acquired new interests in the changed (planned) economy, and lifestyles which came through modern education, non-traditional occupations, and a degree of westernization which accompanied this process. The dominant castes of the regional elites still depend more on Sanskritization than on westernization in their pursuit of upward social mobility. But they encourage their new generations to acquire modern, English-medium education and to adopt new professions. Consequently, such communities as Patidars, Marathas, Reddys, Kammas, and their analogues in different regions were identified with “upper castes”, and not with “backward castes”. Acquisition of modern education and interest in the new planned economy enabled them, like the dwija upper castes, to claim for themselves a new social status and identity, i.e., that of the middle class.

At the same time, the caste identities of both these sections of the “middle class” were far from dissolved. They could comfortably own both the upper-caste status and the middle-class identity, as both categories had become concomitant with each other. While the alliance between the upper caste national elite and the dominant caste regional elites remained tenuous in politics, together they continued to function as a new power-group in the larger society. With the formation and functioning of the middle class as a power group in Indian politics, the elite caste fused with class. Now status, rather than caste as such, had acquired a pronounced power dimension. Since the process of converting traditional status into a new power status was restricted only to the upper rungs in the ritual hierarchy, they sought to use that power in establishing their own caste-like hegemony over the rest of society.It is this nexus between the upper traditional status and new power that has inhibited the transformative potentials of both modernization and democracy in India.

medaram would of course be steadily sanskritized, in the near future. over the last one decade, the state government has slowly moved in, to organize the festival better. just like governments elsewhere organize the kumbh etc. would that make the pilgrims hindus?